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EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON
THE USE OF MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PRO·
CESS. By John H. Beckstrom. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

1989. Pp. 142. $24.95.
In the wake of the legal realists and their successors, there has been
a decline in faith in legal determinism - the view that judicial deci·
sionmaking can be based on principles and rules that originate solely
from within the legal discipline. This loss of faith has led scholars to
look for legitimate bases of judicial and social policymaking in nonle·
gal disciplines, such as philosophy, economics, and sociology. These
scholars hope to derive from these disciplines (preferably neutral)
principles to guide authoritative decisionmaking. Theories of "natural
law" and "popular consensus," grounded largely in philosophy and
ethics, remain suspect as principled lawmaking guides, but have
proved durable in some areas of the law. 1 Scholars have also debated
(to death, perhaps) the contours, strengths and weaknesses of eco·
nomic theory applied to law, debating both its descriptive powers and
prescriptive legitimacy.2
The use of the natural sciences in the law is less well·established, at
least if "established" can be defined as what students are exposed to in
the law school curriculum. Nevertheless, in 1985, John H. Beck·
strom3 showed how a sociobiological theory of human behavior (mod·
1. For one example of the use of societal consensus to support judicial interpretation of the
Constitution, see the various concurring and dissenting opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). Furman held that Georgia's death sentencing statute violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Justice Brennan, concurring, argued that the death penalty itself is "cruel
and unusual punishment," and based this conclusion in part on grounds that "[a]t the very least
•.. contemporary society views this punishment with substantial doubt." 408 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall would have struck down the death penalty as "cruel and
unusual" because he believed "that the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the
material already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional."
408 U.S. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring). At least three of the four dissenting opinions in
Furman implicitly or explicitly agreed that consensus about moral principles provides a framework for policymaking. Two dissents, however, argued that the Court is not in a position to
discern what the consensus, if any, is about capital punishment. In the absence of a clear consensus, the Court should defer to legislatures that, supposedly, reflect what consensus does exist.
408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 436-37 (Powell, J., dissenting). One dissent
argued that consensus provides a basis for legislative, not judicial, action. 408 U.S. at 410-11
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, consensus was both a reason for the Court to intervene (for the
majority) and a reason not to_(for the dissenters).
2. For a thorough defense of the descriptive powers of economic analysis as applied to law,
see R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). For an argument in favor of the
normative application of efficiency analysis to law, see R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE
(1981). For criticism of such an application, see Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J, LEGAL
STUD. 191 (1980), and Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980).
3. Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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em Darwinism) might usefully be applied to legal problems. 4 Now, in
Evolutionary Jurisprudence, Beckstrom builds on his earlier analysis,
assessing more precisely the immediate and prospective powers of
sociobiology to inform lawmaking. 5 The result is a provocative, often
interesting essay. Nevertheless, the reader is left wondering whether
sociobiology can really provide guidance in the formation of judicial
rules, legislation, and social policy, even if its explanation of human
behavior is accurate. 6
Beckstrom begins by explaining the concepts and hypotheses of
modem Darwinism that are relevant to the law. Most important is a
basic tenet of modem Darwinism: "We human gene carriers are
programmed to head toward a definite ultimate goal - optimum
proliferation of our genetic package - and we must bounce off, adjust
to, and utilize what we encounter in our particular environments as we
head toward that goal" (p. 12).
Springing from this central thesis are two other hypotheses. They
are particularly relevant to the law because they posit fairly specific
human behavioral tendencies. 7 "Kin selection" is the idea that
humans are programmed to give aid more readily to persons whose
genetic package more closely resembles their own (pp. 8-9). For example, sociobiologists would predict that if I had to choose, I would
save the life of a parent, fifty percent of whose genes are identical to
my own, rather than an aunt or uncle of the same age, with whom
only twenty-five percent of my genetic package is identical. "Reciprocal altruism" is the idea that some aid-giving activities that do not
directly enhance genetic proliferation can nevertheless be explained by
the expected return to one's own genetic package through future favors. So, we humans are programmed to give aid more readily to
those who are more likely to give aid in the future to us and to our
closest genetic replicas (p. 11).
In the middle chapters, Beckstrom explores how these and other
sociobiological concepts might assist judges, legislators, and other social policymakers. Beckstrom seems most comfortable using sociobiology to help to identify areas in which methodical observation of
4. J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985).
5. "Lawmaking" and "lawmakers" will be referred to frequently in this book notice. The
terms are used in a general sense to include judicial decisionmaking, the enactment of laws by
legislators, and social policymaking in general.
6. Beckstrom also seeks to demonstrate how legal opinions might provide a fruitful source of
inquiry for sociobiologists, and identifies the need both law and sociobiology have for empirical
research. P. 24. Chapter 7 is devoted to exploring the uses that might be made oflegal materials
in sociobiological research, Pp. 96-127. Because this book notice addresses the legal community,
it only assesses the application of sociobiology to law.
7. Beckstrom describes sociobiology's relevance to the law this way: "The potential value to
the legal process rests .•. in instructing all of us • . . on the facts of natural history that bear on
the predictability of human behavior when knowledge of such predictability is important to the
resolution of social problems." P. 4.
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typical human behavior might better inform lawmakers and judges
(pp. 19-24). In deciding cases (or enacting legislation), judges (and
legislators) often rely, at least in part, on their own beliefs about typical human behavior. These judgments are based upon what may be
inadequate information or upon methodologically suspect analyses of
information that is available. 8 When these beliefs conflict with sociobiological predictions of human behavior, judges and legislators, as
well as sociobiologists, should be interested in studies that will help to
determine who is correct. 9 Beckstrom sees immediate value in using
sociobiology "to prompt empirical research on actual typical behavior
important to the law . . . . The theory would ... be used as a signal, in
a given case, that a study of actual behavior should be commissioned"
(p. 24).
Beckstrom also sees immediate use for evolutionist theory in "exposing unconscious self-serving lawmaking" (pp. 76-95). Here the focus is on what sociobiology can tell us about the people who enact
laws and social policies. Sociobiology can help us see when policymakers are serving their own interests because, Beckstrom says, it expands the concept of self-interest in two ways. First, the notions of kin
selection (p. 78) and reciprocal altruism (p. 79) provide a working definition of self-interest. We can identify ulterior, self-interested motives
on the part of a politician, for example, by showing that the choice of
one policy will help proliferate that politician's genetic package (either
directly or indirectly through reciprocal altruism) to a greater extent
than the alternative policy. Second, Beckstrom adds a fascinating explanation of "evolved self-deception" - the idea that the most deceptive people are those who do not even realize they are being deceptive.
According to Beckstrom, because "good" deceivers tend to survive
and proliferate relatively well, and because self-deception is a characteristic of the most successful deceivers, self-deception has evolved as a
genetically programmed human characteristic (pp. 80-82). This somewhat frightening idea expands our understanding of self-interested
lawmaking by suggesting that the self-interest involved in judicial or
legislative choices may be quite unintentional. Beckstrom concludes
8. The existence of these judicial or legislative "intuitions" is explicitly recognized in former
Chief Justice Burger's comment that "[t]rom the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and
judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions." Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 61 (1973). That case involved first amendment scrutiny of a Georgia restriction on showing
pornographic films to consenting adults. The Chief Justice relied on "[t]he sum of experience,"
413 U.S. at 63, to support the link drawn between pornography and antisocial behavior and
thereby certify a legitimate state interest in the restrictions at issue. The example is not offered
because sociobiological inquiry would be particularly useful in testing what the Chief Justice
claims "[t]he sum of experience" actually tells us. It is offered rather to suggest that there has
been a great deal of sociological and psychological research exploring the link between antisocial
behavior and exposure to sexually explicit or violent material. This research, reflecting methods
of inquiry that are far more sophisticated than are "intuition and experience," may aid our thinking, even if people cannot agree on what has been proved.
9. See supra note 6.
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that this expanded concept of self-interest can serve as a basis for a
more forthright and credible legal and political system. "Even if obscure self-interest of the lawmakers were first detected and alleged by
others, avoidance or reform of the law might be facilitated if
lawmakers generally become aware of sociobiology" (p. 82). At the
least, lawmakers would be under greater pressure to justify laws that
are self-serving under the expanded sociobiological definition (p. 83).
Beckstrom also suggests that sociobiology may have direct uses in
the law - direct in the sense that the empirical foundation of the
relevant sociobiological theory of human behavior is so well established that it can be assumed for lawmaking purposes. Here, however,
Beckstrom is far more cautious. He warns that direct application of
evolutionist principles must await the achievement of a substantial
consensus among sociobiologists on concepts and hypotheses and empirical testing of those concepts and hypotheses. Only then may
lawmakers rely on sociobiological theories to correct their intuitions
about human behavior (pp. 24-25). He also points out that direct uses
of evolutionism need not, and should not, be mistaken for normative
statements about what the goals of society ought to be (pp. 35-36).
Finally, Beckstrom devotes Chapter 5 to cautioning the reader that
genetic input to behavior may be more difficult to detect than cultural
input.IO
Within these constraints, Beckstrom suggests that sociobiological
models, applied to legal problems, might (1) facilitate the achievement
of independently set societal goals and (2) help estimate the sociobiological "human costs" of various courses of action. Beckstrom demonstrates the "facilitative" function by explaining how sociobiological
theory suggests that using DNA fingerprinting to test paternity might
encourage broader compliance with child support orders even if such a
test cannot "prove" paternity to a legal certainty. The sociobiological
hypothesis here is that a man's willingness to provide child support
will vary in direct relation to that man's beliefthat the child is actually
his biological offspring. Empirical studies showing a statistical link
between promiscuity and absence of paternal aid-giving behavior in
the societies studied support that theory (pp. 48-53). If these and further observations lead to acceptance of this "paternity confidence"
theory, 11 and if society's independently set goal is to encourage maximum compliance with court orders of child support, then sociobiology
might be applied directly to argue for the use of DNA fingerprinting
to prove paternity.12
·
10. Pp. 55-57. The concept of biocu/tural input, in which genetic and environmental explanations of behavior overlap and mix, is also explored. See pp. 30-33.
11. Beckstrom suggests that the theory might be tested by a study comparing support payments by men subject to "in-wedlock" and "out-of-wedlock" court orders. P. 52.
12. Beckstrom actually presents the idea of showing DNA tests to fathers as an optional
solution that is brought to light through the use of sociobiological theory. It has been presented
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Were Beckstrom's sole purpose in Evolutionary Jurisprudence to
explore the limitations of sociobiology as applied to the law, it would
have to be considered a success. Beckstrom makes the case against the
use of "normative" evolutionism effectively (but I imagine this case is
a fairly easy sell anyway). He also is persuasive in arguing that before
using sociobiology to answer specific legal problems, lawmakers
should accurately interpret relevant biological research and must cautiously assess the relative importance of genetic and cultural contributions to human behavior.
Beckstrom's stated goal, however, is to identify areas of overlap of
law and sociobiology that might serve as bases of "cross-fertilization"
(p. 3). Thus Beckstrom's point in exploriD.g the limits of sociobiology
in the law is probably to suggest areas in which it will be helpful,
rather than to emphasize those areas in which it will not be. 13 In this
endeavor Beckstrom's success is far more limited.
First, the immediate use for sociobiology that Beckstrom identifies
- to suggest areas where empirical research of interest to lawmakers
might be undertaken - says nothing about why sociobiology is
uniquely suited, compared with other disciplines, to lend such aid to
lawmakers. As Beckstrom implies, sociobiological theory need not be
"correct" or accepted to perform this initial function. 14 One might
envision myriad theories of human behavior - economic analysis,
psychological analysis, even anecdotal intuition - that, when in conflict with a lawmaker's determination about how humans actually behave, should similarly evoke interest in further empirical analysis. 15
Beckstrom himself hints at this when, in the introduction to the essay,
he mentions that, while his targeted readers are lawyers and natural
scientists, "I hope the book will reach social scientists as well" (p. 2).
The call, then, is not so much for the use of sociobiology as for more
here as an example of the facilitative function of sociobiology identified earlier in the book, but,
at least in the confines of the "paternity confidence" example, the two uses appear to merge.
13. Beckstrom states as much in the introduction to chapter 5:
Here I will demonstrate how sociobiology may often, even when fully developed, fail to be of
assistance in assessing or predicting typical behavior. That insight should serve as a caution,
but also help us better appreciate the circumstances under which sociobiology does hold
potential for predicting typical behavior.
P. 55.
14. Beckstrom does not state this explicitly, but the notion that sociobiological theory need
not be correct in order to be useful in identifying areas for useful empirical research can be
inferred, and follows logically, from his suggestion that such empirical research "could also serve
as tests of the behavioral hypotheses that prompt the research •..• " P. 24.
15. This is not to say that we could not or should not rank such theories based on how
compelling they are in logic. There may be theories of human behavior with which we are uncomfortable because they have not been proved reliable, but which seem sensible and promising
enough to warrant expenditure of resources for further empirical work when the research may
help solve a legal or social problem. This may be what Beckstrom has in mind when he refers to
the indirect uses of sociobiology. He does not say so explicitly, and even if he did, Beckstrom's
lack of exploration of sociobiology purely as a theory would leave one wondering where Beckstrom thinks sociobiology should stand in ranking such theories.
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empirical observation to inform decisionmaking. Very few would
question the value of empirical observation of human behavior, but
why does sociobiology provide a useful way to order those
observations?
Second, Beckstrom's extensive attempts to downplay or deny the
normative implications of sociobiology in the law are unsuccessful.
That he would want to downplay the normative implications of sociobiology is understandable given the poor reputation of a very famous
normative biological theory, social Darwinism. But Beckstrom's denial of sociobiology's normative thrust is unpersuasive. He admits
that the uses he sees for sociobiology in social engineering may fall
into the murky area between description and prescription, but responds that
what social planners would take from natural science, and use in the
evaluation process, is facts about the root causes of behavior and factual
information on, or estimates of, human costs. The "logic, ethics, and
aesthetics" needed to make tentative and ultimate goal choices would
have to be found elsewhere. [p. 41; footnotes omitted]

This response may be plausible when we are speaking purely about
how sociobiology might be used to facilitate the achievement of independently set societal goals. But Beckstrom's implicit contention that
"human cost" estimation can be viewed for practical purposes as without normative implication is harder to swallow. To convert sociobiological theory about human behavior into estimates of "human cost"
for purposes of policymaking implies not only the acceptance of the
theory, which Beckstrom fairly assumes for purposes of this book, but
also that there is a social value to these human costs that should not be
ignored in determining policy. It is true that "is" and "ought" are not
the same thing, but on some points their confluence is unavoidable:
human costs, of which sociobiology would provide an accounting, are
"facts" that have normative implications.
What is missing, then, is an explanation of how sociobiology offers
an explanation of human behavior that is persuasive enough to compete with or complement other explanations. While it is easy enough
to conceptualize areas in which that may be the case, this book purposefully avoids that issue. To be fair, Beckstrom does, in one paragraph, address the question "why sociobiology?":
I would expect initial resistance to such direct use of substantiated
sociobiology to come from members of the legal profession who have
had experience in dealing with witnesses expert in what one might call
"soft" science. Lawyers have found, for example, that expert opinions as
to when someone should be considered insane and thus legally irresponsible have been based on shifting sands. From this and similar experiences, judges, in particular, have become wary of the social sciences,
often preferring to rely on their own impressions or those of lay jurors.
For good reason, they have generally been more receptive to information
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from "hard" sciences like mathematics and physics. Sociobiology is social science in that it addresses human interactive behavior; however, its
foundations are in genetics, mathematics, and the economic logic of natural processes. Its way of looking at the world is congenial to those
trained, as lawyers are, in logical analysis. . . . I suspect that as growing
numbers of lawyers learn sociobiology, the problem will not be to convince them to use it 'in their profession, but rather to wait until it has
been well tested. [p. 25; footnotes omitted]

Because no further exploration of these ideas is offered, it is' difficult to assess the validity of Beckstrom's claims. It is unclear why
congeniality "to those trained, as lawyers are, in logical analysis" is a
virtue rather than a vice where, as seems to be the case here, the search
is for principles that are not susceptible to legalistic manipulation. In
any event, it is the exploration of these issues that is needed.

- Steven Kasten

